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 CHAPT ER 2 
 Global Bioethics and Political Th eory 
 JOSEPH  MILLUM * 
 INTRODUCTION 
 Th e world is very unequal. While a billion people live in luxury, billions 
more struggle with hunger, pollution, inadequate housing, unsafe work-
ing conditions, economic vulnerability, and poor health care. Many of 
the questions confronted by contemporary bioethicists are aff ected by 
or the product of these gross international inequalities. Some issues 
concern interactions that take place against the backdrop of inequality. 
For example, faced with the disparities between the care that is available 
at home and the care received by their participants, Western researchers 
working in developing countries are forced to consider whether they 
owe participants clinical care, whether there should be local access to the 
fruits of research, and so forth. Other questions concern the structures of 
systems that might themselves be analyzed as just or unjust. For example, 
the implementation of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) agreement means that intellectual property (IP) protec-
tion is international, which aff ects the ability of everyone to access patent-
protected medicines. And economic disparities between countries lead to 
“brain drains” of essential workers from the poor countries where they are 
most needed to rich countries, and allow bett er-off  citizens of industrialized 
*  Th e ideas and opinions expressed are the author’s own. Th ey do not represent any 
offi  cial position or policy of the National Institutes of Health, Public Health Service, or 
Department of Health and Human Services. 
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countries to take advantage of less expensive health care available in 
developing country hospitals through health tourism. 
 Global inequality is, then, the source of a number of bioethical problems. 
Considerations of global justice therefore appear relevant to bioethics. 
However, exactly how we should apply the concept of justice beyond the 
borders of the nation-state remains a matt er of fi erce dispute among 
political theorists. Some — cosmopolitans — argue that exactly the same 
principles of justice apply internationally as they do domestically. Others 
with more statist leanings think that the requirements of justice beyond 
national borders are severely att enuated. It is therefore important to 
consider how these debates are relevant to bioethics. Can bioethicists 
ignore them? Or must they argue for a position on global justice before 
they can properly resolve their specifi c problems? 
 Most bioethicists who address questions to which global justice mat-
ters have not considered the signifi cance of the disputes over the correct 
theory of global justice. Some restrict themselves to analyzing the moral-
ity of individual interactions, and so treat these international bioethical 
problems no diff erently than other cases in applied ethics. Alternatively, 
those bioethicists who take distributive justice seriously generally adopt 
or defend some version of cosmopolitanism. Consequently, the signifi -
cance of the diff erences between theories of global justice for bioethics 
has been obscured. 
 In this paper, I consider when and how these diff erences are important. 
I argue that certain bioethical problems can be resolved without address-
ing disagreements about global justice. People with very diff erent views 
about global justice can converge on the existence of a duty to aid the very 
badly off  — those in absolute poverty — wherever they may be. 1 However, 
despite agreement on extreme cases, there should be disagreement over 
the extent of international obligations to those who are only relatively 
poor. Consequently, diff erent theories of justice will diverge in their impli-
cations for a number of important problems in contemporary bioethics. 
I close by sketching in more detail two contemporary bioethical issues —
 concerning pharmaceutical patents and the health worker brain drain —
 and show how responses to them might be developed by cosmopolitan 
and statist liberals. Th ese sketches demonstrate the relevance of specifi c 
theoretical claims about global justice to particular bioethical problems. 
 JUSTICE 
 Justice, says John Rawls, has as its primary subject matt er “the basic 
structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social 
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institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the 
division of advantages from social cooperation.” 2 Since social cooperation 
may generate burdens, too, we may also say that justice should be con-
cerned with their distribution. 3 Th us, the subject matt er of what has come 
to be known as “distributive justice” is primarily the analysis of social 
institutions, where “institution” can be understood very broadly to include 
both formalized and informal social practices. I include respect for human 
rights under this heading, too, since the realization of human rights is 
a matt er of institutional organization. 4 Distributive justice should be 
distinguished from two other senses of justice that may be of interest to 
bioethicists. Th e fi rst is  transactional justice , which is concerned with the 
conditions under which individual interactions between people or insti-
tutions are permissible (for example, when considering whether a clinical 
trial hosted in a developing country would be exploitative). Th e second is 
 justice as requital , which concerns what should be done when someone 
experiences a loss (for example, through injury as a result of a surgeon’s 
error). I return briefl y to these other senses of justice later in this chapter; 
here, I focus primarily on theories of international distributive justice. 
When I mention justice  simpliciter I mean this sense of justice. 
 When analyzing theories of justice, we should distinguish  ideal and 
 non-ideal theory. According to Rawls,  ideal theory concerns well-ordered 
institutional arrangements — that is, those institutional arrangements 
that are just, are known to be just, and with which individuals subject to 
the institutions willingly comply. 5 Th e central task for ideal theorists, 
therefore, is working out realizable conceptions of just institutional 
arrangements.  Non-ideal theory, by contrast, deals with the obligations 
that arise either when institutional arrangements are not completely just, 
when the individuals subject to the institutions do not fully comply with 
them, or, commonly, both. 6 
 Academic philosophers have most rigorously explored questions of 
ideal theory. Th eir answers tell us what a just state or a just global order 
would look like. However, our day-to-day concerns about justice are not 
just about the fi nal goal at which people working for justice should aim. 
We also want to know what to do in the face of the practical problems that 
arise in our imperfect world. Th ese are generally questions of non-ideal 
theory. For example, ethical questions about health worker migration (the 
brain drain) are premised on the massive economic inequality between 
countries. If the disparities between countries were not so large, move-
ment between them would probably not be so unidirectional (i.e., from 
poor to rich), and people would therefore be unlikely to be so troubled 
about the question of its regulation. International bioethicists must there-
fore concern themselves with non-ideal theory, as well as ideal theory. 
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 THE EXTENT OF INTERNATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
OF JUSTICE 
 A central question that divides theorists writing about global justice, and 
that aff ects most directly problems in international bioethics, concerns 
what the people and governments of rich countries owe to those outside 
their borders. 7 Th e possible answers are generally thought to range from 
“the same as they owe to similarly situated people inside their borders” to 
“nothing at all.” Consequently, answering this question satisfactorily 
requires addressing both the scope and the content of the requirements of 
global justice. In this section, I sketch the spectrum of possible positions 
and explain how they might be defended. Th is allows me to show when 
and how disagreements about global justice should make a diff erence to 
answers to bioethical questions. 
 Th e views occupying the two extremes I label  cosmopolitan and  statist . 8 
According to pure cosmopolitans, the principles of distributive justice that 
apply in the domestic sphere apply equally internationally. 9 Th us, if Rawls’ 
diff erence principle were the right way to allocate primary goods within a 
country, there should also be a global diff erence principle allocating pri-
mary goods among all people in the world. 10 According to pure statists, 
principles of distributive justice apply only domestically. Between these 
two lie more moderate statist positions that acknowledge cross-border 
duties of justice but claim that they are weaker than domestic duties. 
 One need not be of any particular political creed to be a cosmopolitan 
or a statist. For example, liberal egalitarians could think that the princi-
ples they endorse require redistribution for equality across the globe; but 
equally, a libertarian could think that the same principles should apply to 
institutions in order to protect property rights and negative liberties 
around the world. 11 Nevertheless, the discussion of the international scope 
of principles of justice has been dominated by arguments between cosmo-
politan liberals on the one side, and statist liberals and communitarians 
on the other. 12 
 Cosmopolitanism 
 Cosmopolitan positions may be distinguished by the grounds that are 
thought to underlie them.  Humanitarian cosmopolitans believe that duties 
of justice do not arise from associations like the state, but from character-
istics of persons as such, independent of their relations to other persons. 
Any utilitarian theory of global justice should take this route, since utili-
tarians hold that the ultimate justifi cation for principles of justice is their 
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contribution to aggregate utility, and it is irrelevant in whom that utility 
is located. 13 
 Political cosmopolitans accept that some characteristics of associations 
like those epitomized by the state are the grounds for the applicability of 
the requirements of justice, but argue that these characteristics are in fact 
found in international associations, too. For example, it might be thought 
that mutually benefi cial cooperation between individuals is necessary 
and suffi  cient to ground requirements of justice in the distribution of the 
products of that cooperation. Th e extent and importance of global trade 
could then be cited as evidence that mutually benefi cial cooperation 
extends well beyond national borders. Th is would imply that the require-
ments of justice extend beyond national borders, too. 14 
 Th is latt er strategy is used by Charles Beitz in  Political Th eory and 
International Relations . He argues that the global institutional order is 
analogous to a state in two key respects. First, there is an analogy between 
the arbitrariness of the natural distribution of talents between individuals 
and the arbitrariness of the natural distribution of resources between 
states. 15 As with natural talents, Beitz argues, social institutions should 
not allow these morally arbitrary diff erences to disadvantage people. 
He concludes: 
 Th e underlying principle is that each person has an equal prima facie claim to a share 
of the total available resources, but departures from this initial standard could 
be justifi ed (analogously to the operation of the diff erence principle) if the result-
ing inequalities were to the greatest benefi t of those least advantaged by the 
inequality. 16 
 Second, Beitz argues that substantive global economic interdepen-
dence exists in the form of international investment and trade, and 
that this interdependence “yields substantial aggregate benefi ts.” 17 Th ese 
international transactions are regulated by global institutions, as well as 
by informal practices of economic policy coordination. Th us, there exist 
cooperative interactions that generate benefi ts and burdens that must be 
distributed, and there exist institutions that already aff ect the distribu-
tion of those benefi ts and burdens. Th ese are the very conditions, Beitz 
argues, that motivated Rawls to argue that the institutions that constitute 
the basic structure of a society must be designed in accordance with 
principles of justice. In exactly the same way, therefore, we can determine 
the principles that should govern the distribution of benefi ts and 
burdens. Beitz proposes a global “original position” constituted by indi-
viduals (not peoples, as Rawls later has it). 18 From this original position, 
ignorant of their nationality, Beitz argues, people would choose the same 
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principles in the international case as in the national one, and for the 
same reasons. 
 Unlike humanitarian cosmopolitanism, the political strategy for 
justifying cosmopolitanism makes its truth contingent. In a world of 
autarkic states there would not be any duties of international justice. In 
the present world, presumably, if there are states or communities that 
are suffi  ciently separate from the rest of the international community, 
then they are not owed assistance as a matt er of justice. To some, this 
may be disquieting: whether the billions of poor people in the world have 
a justice-based claim to assistance is dependent on whether they happen 
to be part of the global economy. Worse, it is the very poorest in the 
world who are most likely to be excluded from the global economy and 
therefore, on this account, most likely to be excluded from justice-based 
consideration. 19 To others, this fi ts with longstanding intuitions about 
the applicability of claims of justice. 
 Statism 
 We may divide statists into  nationalist statists and  political statists . 
Nationalist statists think that there is something morally important about 
nationality, independent of the state, that is suffi  cient to ground special 
duties toward co-nationals and that makes it permissible to prefer 
co-nationals. For some, this is because being part of a national culture is 
necessary for a person’s identity as a moral being. 20 For others, it is because 
of the great value of national cultures. 21 Nationalists argue against cosmo-
politanism on the grounds that it does not make room for the moral 
importance of national ties. 
 Nations and political states may, of course, come apart, since political 
borders are not always drawn around groups of people who share a national 
identity. I include nationalists as a form of statist because they privilege 
co-nationals (as political statists privilege co-citizens) rather than treat-
ing everyone the same, and because nationalists typically view an inde-
pendent state as one of the desiderata for a nation. 22 Indeed, one of the 
primary motivations of more practically minded nationalist theorists is to 
defend the demands of some cultural or ethnic group for its own state. 
 Political statists argue that obligations of justice arise only when a state 
already exists. Th e associative relationships between people in the same 
state generate normative relationships between them that did not exist 
before. However, political statists deny that the current relationships 
between people in diff erent states are suffi  ciently like being in a state to 
generate similar normative relationships. Th omas Nagel, for example, 
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argues that the state is distinctive because of the coercive power that 
it wields over its citizens and because the actions of the state (e.g., in 
wielding this power) are taken in the name of its citizens. Neither of these 
characteristics, Nagel says, applies to existing international institutions. 23 
Political statists therefore accept that the global order  could be such that 
the requirements of justice were universal (if, for example, there were a 
world government). Th ey simply deny that the requisite empirical condi-
tions exist. Th ey therefore reject the second strategy for defending cosmo-
politanism outlined above. 
 Degrees of Statism 
 It is helpful to distinguish statist positions according to the degree of 
normative primacy they assign to the state. A  pure statist would deny 
that there are any duties of justice that extend outside the borders of 
the state. However, few theorists seem willing to adopt such an extreme 
position. More are what I will call  strong statists : they hold that the 
main locus of duties of justice is the state, but allow some very att enuated 
duties of justice outside its borders. For example, Rawls’ Law of Peoples 
states the principles of justice that should govern the interactions of lib-
eral states with other states. Th ese principles do not include distributive 
principles, like those that apply to domestic institutions: Rawls does 
not think inequalities between states are the proper subject matt er of 
justice. However, as well as constraints on how states may interact, 
Rawls acknowledges a duty of assistance to “other peoples living under 
unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political 
and social regime” to help them reach a point where they can have a just or 
decent regime. 24 As I note in the following section, depending on how 
many people live under such unfavorable conditions, this duty may be 
quite stringent. 
 Although most discussion of the scope and content of requirements 
of global justice so far has contrasted cosmopolitan and strong statist posi-
tions, there is also room for intermediate positions. Such  moderate statist 
positions would recognize some signifi cant requirements of justice 
beyond the boundaries of the state, but would limit their nature or extent. 
Limitations on international duties could take diff erent forms. For 
instance, there might be duties owed to co-citizens that must be fulfi lled 
before duties to non-citizens take eff ect; it might be that what is owed to 
non-citizens is less than what is owed to co-citizens; or it might be that 
certain duties of justice apply both domestically and internationally and 
others apply only domestically. 25 
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 For example, one way to argue for a moderate statist position would be 
to show that some duties of justice apply in virtue of people’s moral status 
and other duties require some special relationship between the people to 
whom the duties apply. Diff erent duties of justice falling into the latt er 
category could then be stratifi ed according to the nature of these relation-
ships. For example, purely economic transactions might be governed by 
principles of fairness for the distribution of the benefi ts and burdens of 
just those transactions. But political rights might remain with just the 
people living within the borders of a state, since only they would be right-
fully subject to that state’s coercive authority. Such moderate statist posi-
tions have not been much explored in the literature on global justice. 26 
 ABSOLUTE POVERTY AND AGREEMENT 
ON INTERNATIONAL DUTIES 
 Despite the large diff erences between theories concerning the scope and 
content of the requirements of global justice, there is still a substantial 
core of agreement among most commentators regarding certain duties 
that extend past national borders. In the case of people who are suffi  ciently 
badly off , almost everyone endorses normative principles that commit 
them to some duty of assistance incumbent on those who can help. 
Consequently, when it comes to bioethical problems that are primarily of 
relevance to this group, there is no need for extended arguments about 
global justice: agreement on a duty to help can be assumed. 
 Th is agreement applies clearly to the case of people living in conditions 
of what Peter Singer calls “absolute poverty.” 27 Th eir deprivation is such 
that even their most basic needs (for nutritionally adequate food, clean 
water, shelter, basic health care, and so forth) are not met. According to 
the most recent fi gures from the World Bank, in 2005 approximately 
1.4 billion people were living on US$1.25 a day or less, 28 the measure 
the World Bank now uses to judge absolute poverty. 29 Absolute poverty 
indicates both that the people suff ering from it are very poor indeed, 
and also that their poverty is not simply relative to other people. Th ere 
are also billions of people in the world who live in what I will call  only 
relative poverty — people who are able to meet their basic needs, but 
who are very poor relative to other people in their community, country, or 
the world. I argue shortly that agreement on international duties of assis-
tance disappears when we come to this group. Consequently, when it 
comes to bioethical questions that concern the only relatively poor, com-
plete answers will likely require bioethicists to articulate and defend 
political views. 
MIllum_Ch-02.indd   24 11/30/2011   2:55:56 PM
G L O B A L  B I O ET H I CS  A N D  P O L I T I C A L  T H EO RY 25
 For many of the absolutely poor, there are many actors who could 
ameliorate their situation. National governments in all but the poorest 
countries could prioritize their spending diff erently and save many lives. 
Other governments, particularly those of the richest countries in the 
world, could provide directed aid that would help the poor, and could 
negotiate transnational economic policies that help instead of exacerbat-
ing global poverty. Even individuals now have the power to save the lives 
of distant others, through donations to nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) that provide essential services in very poor environments. 30 
 Given the extent of the deprivation of the absolutely poor and the 
possibility of ameliorating at least some of it, we can see why people 
who have quite diff erent political views are still likely to converge on the 
conclusion that governments and individuals have a duty to assist the 
absolutely poor. 31 
 Consider fi rst the diff erent theories of international distributive 
justice. Most clearly, humanitarian cosmopolitans believe that all the 
absolutely poor have a right to assistance, since their claims to resources 
have an equal standing with the claims of everyone else. Th is claim is held 
against any and all governments that can meet it (and, perhaps, against 
nongovernmental institutions and individuals, too). For political cosmo-
politans, the requirements of justice apply when people are involved in 
systems of cooperation that generate benefi ts and burdens, like the state. 
Th ey believe that the existing international order — such as the global eco-
nomic order that is given formal shape by institutions like the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) — is suffi  cient to generate obligations of justice with 
regard to those within it. As I noted above, this is liable to exclude people 
who are not part of the international economic system. Moreover, many 
of the absolutely poor are marginalized to the point that their contribu-
tion to the global economy is negligible. Th is might lead someone to the 
conclusion that the absolutely poor would therefore not have a justice-
based claim to resources under the political cosmopolitan’s rationale. But 
this would be a mistake. Th e great majority of the absolutely poor are still 
aff ected by the global economic system, even if they are not great con-
tributors to it. For example, whether or not they have employment, train-
ing, or social security may be determined partly by international economic 
policies and agreements. Th us, though many of the absolutely poor may 
be excluded from benefi cial participation in the global economic system, 
it is still a powerful determinant of their life prospects. 
 One does not have to be a liberal cosmopolitan to think that the exis-
tence of people in conditions of avoidable absolute poverty entails a duty 
to assist them. 32 Only pure statists deny that there are  any international 
duties of justice. 33 So, for example, Rawls, a strong political statist, denies 
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that we have duties to ameliorate the poverty of people in other states, 
even if they have much less than we do, so long as they are able to live 
under just or decent regimes. But, as I noted in the previous section, he 
does think that there is a duty of assistance to people who are unable to 
live under such regimes. Th is duty of assistance includes securing the 
“basic needs” of people in burdened societies. 34 All except the most 
extreme nationalist statists may agree. Th ough nationalists believe that 
there are reasons to favor co-nationals over non-nationals, most accept 
that there are  some duties owed to people of diff erent nationalities, and 
that those duties can take preference over helping co-nationals, when the 
needs of the other people are urgent enough. For example, David Miller 
writes: 
 [W]e can agree that the existence of societies scoring very low on the HDI [Human 
Development Index, calculated by the United Nations Development Programme] is 
a global injustice without agreeing about why it is an injustice — whether by virtue of 
the inequality between rich and poor societies, or simply by virtue of the absolute 
level of deprivation experienced by most members of the poorest societies. Our 
moral responses to the global status quo are over-determined, and so we can agree 
in practice about what needs to be done most urgently to promote global justice with-
out having to formulate explicitly the principles that lie behind this judgement. 35 
 Even if it were argued that there are some people beyond national 
borders who fall outside the scope of distributive justice, there are other 
universally acknowledged moral duties. First, the very poor are frequently 
considered to be the victims of a global economic order that has been 
imposed upon them (mainly by rich country governments whose bargain-
ing power allows them to shape international agreements in favor of 
their own perceived economic and geopolitical interests). For example, 
the structural adjustment programs instituted during the 1980s and 1990s 
by many developing-country governments, under pressure from global 
institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
appear to have made many people in those countries worse off . 36 People 
may therefore be starving as a direct result of the actions of rich-country 
governments. If these empirical claims are correct, then those responsible 
owe assistance to their victims as a matt er of compensatory justice. 
 Second, there are humanitarian duties, which are thought to apply just 
by virtue of the benefi ciary of the duty having morally signifi cant needs, 
and not because of some special relation between the duty bearer and the 
benefi ciary. 37 Consider, for example, the duty of rescue, according to 
which we are obliged to provide urgently needed assistance to others 
when we can do so without great cost to ourselves. Th ough there is 
MIllum_Ch-02.indd   26 11/30/2011   2:55:56 PM
G L O B A L  B I O ET H I CS  A N D  P O L I T I C A L  T H EO RY 27
dispute over the extent of duties of rescue, including exactly how much 
we can be obliged to sacrifi ce for others and whether the duty changes in 
the face of others’ non-compliance, 38 it is hard to see how someone could 
consistently believe in any duty of rescue but deny that the rich people 
and governments of the world have a duty to spend the relatively small 
amounts of money necessary to provide people with clean water or 
life-saving vaccinations. 
 Th us, the depth of the deprivation of the absolutely poor means that 
it is overdetermined that citizens and governments of rich countries 
have some duties to help them. Since everyone endorses at least one of the 
normative principles I just outlined, everyone is committ ed to a global 
duty of assistance to the absolutely poor. 39 Th e consensus that exists is 
therefore a function of the truly awful situation of the world’s poor, rather 
than any theoretically interesting agreement between diff erent theories 
of justice. 
 Th is consensus is not available when we turn our att ention to people 
who are very poor by the standards of rich countries, but not in such 
desperate straits as the absolutely poor. Th e justifi cations I just gave do 
not apply to them, or, at least, it is controversial whether they do. First, 
strong statists generally argue that relative poverty is the business of 
the state, and not the business of other states. For Rawls, for example, once 
a people has the resources to live under a “just or decent political and 
social regime,” the duty of assistance cuts off . 40 Second, the principle of 
compensatory justice may not apply to many of those who are only rela-
tively poor. Standards of living have improved for many people in the 
world over the past few decades, which makes it far from clear that they 
have been harmed by the international economic system. 41 Finally, the 
duty of rescue applies only when a great good can be provided to someone 
at a low cost to the provider (that is, when it is possible to execute an “easy 
rescue”). But as we move further from the satisfaction of basic needs to 
other things that might improve the well-being of the relatively poor, the 
extent to which they benefi t is likely to decrease, while the cost of provid-
ing the benefi t increases. For example, the cost of saving a human life by 
providing the traditional immunization program of childhood vaccina-
tions in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa is approximately US$205. 42 
By contrast, hip resurfacing surgery, which generally aims only at improved 
mobility and pain reduction and is mostly performed on elderly patients, 
costs around US$5,000 in private Indian hospitals. 43 
 Compared to the average citizen of a developed country, billions of 
people in the world are only relatively poor. Were these people citizens 
of one of these developed countries, most statists (and cosmopolitans, of 
course) would agree that they deserved assistance as a matt er of justice. 
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However, as I just argued, strong statists will generally not agree that 
those in other countries who are only relatively poor deserve assistance 
from developed countries. Th is, then, is the key diff erence between the 
implications of statist and cosmopolitan theories of global justice. It is a 
diff erence that has implications for how we should respond to a number of 
important bioethical problems. It demarcates the range of problems con-
cerning which bioethicists cannot assume that there will be agreement 
about duties to people outside national borders, and therefore the area 
where fully addressing these problems requires engaging with the debate 
over global justice. In the section entitled “Two Th eories of Justice and 
Two Bioethical Questions” I illustrate this by considering how diff erent 
theories of justice apply to two specifi c problems — pharmaceutical pat-
ents and the brain drain. But before I can do this, I must say something 
about the notion of basic health care, because these bioethical problems 
relate to health care, and the inability to access basic health care is indica-
tive of absolute poverty. 
 ABSOLUTE POVERTY AND BASIC HEALTH CARE 
 Whether someone is in absolute poverty depends on the resources to 
which he or she has access. Th e absolutely poor lack access to the resources 
that are necessary for leading a minimally decent life. Access to health 
care is one of these resources: without health care, someone’s life pros-
pects are likely to be severely diminished. I will call  basic health care the 
level of health care someone must be able to access in order to escape 
absolute poverty. 44 People may be able to access basic health care because 
they have the personal wealth needed to pay for medical treatment or 
health insurance, or they may be able to access it because it is supplied to 
them through a public health care system. How they are able to access it is 
not important to my analysis here. 45 
 Unlike, say, necessary nutrition, defi ning basic health care is compli-
cated. Everyone has similar nutritional needs, and so we could confi dently 
place an upper bound on the amount of food someone would need to be 
able to access in order to escape absolute poverty. But people have very 
diff erent health needs. People with certain conditions may need treat-
ment that is very expensive. For example, the average price of a possibly 
life-saving heart bypass is around US$20,000. 46 Are people who are 
unable to aff ord a heart bypass absolutely poor? Th is seems implausible: if 
we were to call people absolutely poor because they could not aff ord every 
medical intervention they might possibly need, this would detach the 
concept of absolute poverty from our intuitive understanding of what it 
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means, and from the justifi cations that imply a duty to help people in 
absolute poverty. Th us, basic health care will include some, but by no 
means all, of the medical care that someone might need in order to lead a 
minimally decent life. Whether a particular intervention is included will 
presumably depend on whether its cost-eff ectiveness reaches a certain 
threshold. 47 
 It follows that people in only relative poverty are nevertheless likely to 
lack health care for many conditions. For example, people in only relative 
poverty still might not have access to hepatitis A vaccines, treatment for 
deteriorating eyesight, heart bypass surgery, and so forth. Such treatments 
are not trivial: they are necessary for good health. However, they may not 
be necessary for someone to escape absolute poverty. 
 Th is analysis tells us how the conclusions I drew about agreement and 
disagreement between diff erent political theorists should apply to the 
particular cases of medical research and health care provision. Agreement 
on the existence of a duty to aid those in absolute poverty leads to the 
conclusion that there is a universal obligation to encourage research and 
health care provision such that everyone is able to access basic health 
care. However, disagreement over what is owed to the only relatively poor 
will create disagreement about what medical research should be funded, 
what care should be provided by whom, and how the rules governing 
research and provision of care are constrained. For the strong statist, rela-
tive poverty matt ers within the state; outside the state it does not. Th us, 
according to a strong statist, people living within a comparatively rich 
country may have a justice-based claim that their government support 
research into diseases that aff ect them, and ensure that they can access 
existing treatments for these diseases. Th e same government will not have 
similar obligations to people living in relative poverty in other, poorer 
countries. 
 In the following section I explore this implication in greater detail, by 
examining two important questions of international health policy. 
 TWO THEORIES OF JUSTICE AND TWO 
BIOETHICAL QUESTIONS 
 For the most part, bioethicists who have addressed questions involving 
international justice have taken one of two routes. First, some bracket the 
broader theoretical questions of distributive justice and make do with 
moral analysis on a more narrow scale. Th ey discuss, for example, particu-
lar interactions between individuals, or appeal directly to the needs 
people have or the harms they perceive are being caused. In short, they do 
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traditional applied ethics in the international sphere. 48 Second, those who 
argue from more foundational theories of justice to specifi c conclusions 
about policy or practice usually do so by assuming or defending some 
version of cosmopolitan liberalism. 49 Furthermore, these analyses fre-
quently focus on the plight of the worst off  (who are generally the abso-
lutely poor). Th e result is that the implications of the diff erences between 
theories of global justice have oft en been obscured. 50 
 I close by sketching two bioethical problems and showing how cosmo-
politan and statist liberals are likely to develop responses to them. One 
concerns IP and its eff ects on access to medicines; the other concerns the 
brain drain of health care workers from developing to developed coun-
tries. For reasons of space these are no more than sketches; they are not 
intended as contributions to the debate about these specifi c issues, but 
to illustrate the importance of the diff erences between theories of global 
justice noted above. 
 Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines 
 Private research and development of health care products is primarily 
motivated by patent laws. A patent allows the inventor of a novel product 
or process to prevent others from making commercial use of that product 
or process for the lifetime of the patent (normally 20 years). Patents on 
medicines allow pharmaceutical companies to charge much more than 
the cost of production for the medicines and so recoup their substantial 
research and development expenditure (as well as making a tidy profi t). 
 In 1994 the WTO established the TRIPS agreement, which will stan-
dardize IP laws across WTO states to the higher levels found in developed 
countries. Th e least developed countries have until 2016 to implement 
TRIPS, but its eff ects are already being felt. In India, the generic drug 
industry is now threatened by the 2005 Indian Patents Act implementing 
TRIPS and establishing a 20-year patent life for products and processes. 
Individual countries are also pressured into implementing IP laws that 
give even more protection than TRIPS (“TRIPS-plus” agreements), prin-
cipally through bilateral free trade agreements with the United States 
or European Union. 
 Th e patent-based approach to incentivizing the development of new 
medicines has several drawbacks, which are exacerbated in the global 
environment. First, for those products that get developed, the prices set 
during the life of the patent are (in principle) determined by what will 
maximize revenue, not what will maximize the number of people using 
the product. Th is means that new medicines are frequently priced out of 
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the reach of a substantial proportion of the people who would benefi t from 
them. Second, the patent system aff ects the products that actually get 
developed. Since the central motivation of pharmaceutical companies is 
profi t, companies tend to develop products on the basis of whether they 
can be sold, not their impact on health. Th is has at least two consequences: 
it encourages the development of expensive products rather than cheaper 
interventions that might benefi t health more, and it means that the health 
problems for which products are developed will be the problems of people 
who have the money to buy them. Consequently, the current international 
IP system has been widely criticized for producing medicines that only 
the rich can aff ord, and that focus mainly on the problems of the rich. 51 
It means that millions of people do not have access to urgently needed 
medicines, and the development of new interventions does not focus on 
the problems that are most urgent for the global poor. 
 Alternative ways to incentivize the development of important health 
interventions have been proposed, including alternative types of patent 
that reward inventors in proportion to the positive health eff ects of their 
interventions, 52 and rules that give greater power to governments to nego-
tiate prices or overrule patents. 53 Arguments in favor of and against these 
various systems get couched in the language of social justice. I am not 
going to assess the merits of these proposals here: the essential point for 
my argument is that there are alternative ways in which a system could be 
set up, and therefore the system is amenable to moral assessment. 
Moreover, I now argue, diff erent theories of global justice should diverge 
in their views about which system should be preferred. 
 Considering the previous arguments about research priorities and 
access to medicines, there should be some agreement among diff erent 
theorists. Th ose arguments suggest that even for strong statists the 
international IP regime should not impede access to medicines that are 
required for basic health care. 
 But for the strong statist, when it comes to other interventions and con-
ditions — those that apply to the development and marketing of treat-
ments that are not part of basic health care, as I have defi ned it — whatever 
gets negotiated between governments stands, even if it is to the disadvan-
tage of some and the advantage of others. Nagel, for example, denies that 
the sort of collective commercial engagement constituted by agreements 
overseen by the WTO is suffi  cient to trigger obligations of justice. 54 
Instead, he argues, the agreements made may have whatever content the 
contracting parties agree upon: “contracts between sovereign states  . . . 
are ‘pure’ contracts, and nothing guarantees the justice of their results.” 55 
Th us, for example, Nagel would say that so long as it does not impede 
the ability of British citizens to access health care, and so long as there are 
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suffi  cient exceptions to allow people in developing countries to access 
truly basic health care, support by the UK government for TRIPS or 
“TRIPS-plus” IP regimes cannot be criticized on the ground of justice. 
 Th e strong statist line would be opposed by cosmopolitan liberals. Th is 
can be seen most clearly if we assume that the diff erent parties agree on 
the grounds for IP protection (e.g., if we suppose that they agree that an 
instrumentalist justifi cation is correct). Suppose, for example, that the 
strong statist and the cosmopolitan are agreed that the right system of IP 
over pharmaceutical products is whatever system maximizes the long-
term health gains from medical treatments. Th e strong statist thinks that 
the health gains that count for making this evaluation are gains to people 
within a particular state, subject to the caveat just noted concerning basic 
health care. Th us, according to the strong statist, when the UK sets domes-
tic IP laws or negotiates international laws, it should evaluate the health 
gains to people within the UK only (again subject to the caveat). Th e cos-
mopolitan, on the other hand, thinks that the gains that count for this 
evaluation are health gains to everyone in the world. Th us, when the UK 
sets domestic IP laws or negotiates international agreements, it should 
take into account the eff ects of the laws on everyone. 
 Diff erent ways of sett ing up the international IP system will lead to dif-
ferent research being conducted, and so to diff erent products coming to 
the market, at diff erent prices. In other words, diff erent IP systems will be 
bett er or worse at meeting particular sets of health research priorities. But 
the global health research priorities are very diff erent than the domestic 
health research priorities of developed countries. 56 For example, of the 
estimated 241 million cases of malaria each year, 204 million take place in 
Africa and a mere 3 million in the Americas and Europe. 57 Th us, we can 
expect that the IP system for pharmaceuticals supported by a strong stat-
ist will be quite diff erent from the system supported by a cosmopolitan. 
 It might be objected that the implications of the theoretical disagree-
ment between cosmopolitans and strong statists are much less substantial 
than I have claimed. Suppose that the international IP system has a nega-
tive eff ect on people who are only relatively poor within a particular coun-
try. If it thereby precludes their government from fulfi lling its  domestic 
duties of justice, it can be condemned on those grounds. Th us, it might be 
thought, the strong statist will have to condemn the international IP 
system in much the same set of cases as the cosmopolitan. 58 In response, 
we should remind ourselves of what the requirements of domestic justice 
are: they demand, among other things, fairness in the distribution of 
resources within the state. But this says nothing about the amount of 
resources a state is able to distribute. Its international agreements may 
positively or negatively aff ect those resources, as may the actions of 
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other states. But those agreements need not aff ect whether the resources 
within a state are distributed fairly between its citizens. Th us, the interna-
tional IP system is unlikely to actually preclude a government from 
being domestically just, at least with regard to the only relatively poor, 
and therefore cannot be condemned on those grounds. 
 It is worth noting that moderate statists might also oppose the strong 
statist view regarding the permissible IP rules governing pharmaceutical 
patents. Th e WTO is a complex international organization, which has 
signifi cant eff ects on people’s lives and the power to enforce compliance 
with agreements. 59 Leaving the WTO is liable to come with substantial 
economic costs. For moderate statists, these characteristics may be suffi  -
cient to generate some obligations of justice, even if the WTO’s require-
ments are not as stringent as the obligations generated by a fully fl edged 
state. For example, moderate statists could argue on that basis that at least 
the economic and health gains from the international IP system should be 
shared fairly among the various parties aff ected by it. 
 Th e Health Care Worker Brain Drain 
 My second case concerns the brain drain: the systemic loss of skilled 
workers from one economic sector to another. In many developing coun-
tries, brain drains of health workers (such as doctors and nurses) are of 
grave concern. Th ey take two forms: fi rst, within-country brain drains 
from the public to the private sector; second, international brain drains, 
from poorer to richer countries. I focus here on the latt er. 
 Huge numbers of health workers are economic migrants. For example, 
a 2006 WHO report estimated that 25 % of the doctors and 5 % of the 
nurses trained in Africa were currently employed in industrialized coun-
tries that are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD). 60 Frequently, these workers are actively 
recruited by the recipient country in order to make up for a perceived 
shortage of locally trained workers. Th e policies of recipient countries, 
specifi cally with regard to the training, recruitment, and immigration of 
health workers, thereby have large and predictable eff ects on whether 
health workers trained in developing countries migrate. Th is migration 
exacerbates existing inequalities in trained personnel. For example, the 
doctor–patient ratio in sub-Saharan Africa is now estimated at about 
20 per 100,000, compared with a ratio of 220 per 100,000 in developed 
countries. 61 
 Th e emigration of health workers is generally thought to negatively 
aff ect donor countries. 62 Th ough there is some gain through remitt ances 
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home, transnational networking, and workers who eventually return 
bett er trained to their country of origin, these are more than negated by 
the lost investments in training and shortages of personnel. I consider the 
justice of policies related to health worker migration on the assumption 
that this empirical claim is correct. 
 Th ree key actors are involved in the health worker brain drain: the 
recipient country, the donor country, and the health workers themselves. 63 
Each may assert claims. For example, donor countries may argue that they 
have the right to compensation from recipient countries or that they may 
require locally trained health workers to work domestically for some 
period aft er they qualify. Health workers may claim that they have both a 
right to the education they receive and the right to emigrate to any coun-
try that will accept them. Finally, recipient countries may assert their right 
to open their borders to whomever they choose. 
 What do the theories of international justice tell us about the duties of 
recipient countries, with regard to their recruiting policies, and the rights 
of donor countries? 
 First, as with the eff ects of IP rules, the eff ects of the brain drain on 
absolute poverty must be considered. Some minimum level of health care 
worker coverage is clearly necessary for everyone to have basic health 
care, and therefore for everyone to be brought out of absolute poverty. In 
countries where, for instance, the number of health care providers is so 
low that routine childhood vaccinations cannot be supplied, or where 
many people have no access to maternal health services, the lack of trained 
health care personnel perpetuates absolute poverty. For example, Chen 
et al. suggest a threshold of 2.5 health care workers per 1,000 for meeting 
targets of 80 % coverage of measles immunizations and skilled att endants 
at birth. 64 WHO estimates that the average density of health workers in 
Africa is 2.3 per 1,000, as compared to 18.9 per 1,000 in Europe and 24.8 
per 1,000 in the Americas. 65 While sub-Saharan Africa has only 3 % of the 
world’s health workers, it has 24 % of the world’s burden of diseases. 66 
Again, theorists of all persuasions ought to agree on an international duty 
to prevent further loss of health care workers from absolutely impover-
ished areas and help them reach the minimal levels of coverage necessary 
to bring them out of absolute poverty. Some measures may have to be 
domestic, since the brain drain typically involves a loss of trained workers 
from rural to urban (and from public to private) environments within a 
country. But others can be international, since the international brain 
drain appears to exacerbate this loss. However, once the minimal level is 
met for a population, large disparities in health care workers will likely 
remain. Th e diff erent theories of global justice will again diverge in their 
views about the appropriate response to those disparities. 67 
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 For the strong statist, above the minimal level of health care workers 
needed for the provision of basic health care, the additional health gains 
from having more trained doctors, nurses, and so forth will no longer be 
the concern of foreign countries and governments, even though people 
may have claims against their own governments to supply them. 68 Th us, 
strong statists are likely to see nothing wrong with hiring health workers 
from the developing world, so long as they come voluntarily and legally 
(according to immigration agreements) and do not violate any duties the 
hiring state has to give its citizens priority for employment. 69 
 In contrast to strong statists, the cosmopolitan liberal will look for 
those emigration and immigration policies that would have the optimal 
impact on global health, independent of location. Th is would surely 
militate in favor of policies to restrict the migration of health workers 
from developing countries (insofar as that does not violate their human 
rights) or at least to heavily incentivize them to stay in the countries 
where they are trained. Moreover, the policy recommendations of the cos-
mopolitan should apply equally to both emigration and immigration: 
donor countries have an obligation to do what they ethically can to retain 
needed health care workers, and recipient countries have a duty to restrict 
health care workers’ movement away from the places where they can do 
the most good. Given cosmopolitans’ rejection of the normative signifi -
cance of national boundaries, in an ideal world we might expect them 
to be most in favor of freedom of movement. Somewhat ironically, in 
the actual non-ideal world they should support restricting freedom of 
movement. 
 In fact, consistent cosmopolitans might be committ ed to even more 
extensive redistributive duties. As noted above, almost all of the countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa have massive burdens of preventable or treatable 
diseases, but inadequate health care infrastructure and far fewer health 
workers than they need. Th e good that any particular physician could do 
(with appropriate supportive funding) in sub-Saharan Africa is far greater 
than the good he or she could do in the UK (to take an arbitrary developed 
country). Now, on the cosmopolitan view, the UK should defi nitely be 
investing in training health workers in sub-Saharan Africa (as well as 
taking measures to reduce their emigration to the UK). But this will take 
time. In the short term, the greatest progress towards a just allocation of 
doctors would be for the UK to send substantial numbers of its doctors to 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa — that is, to encourage a “reverse brain 
drain.” Aft er all, at the moment they could do far more good there. 
 Naturally, such a proposal would generate all sorts of objections: it 
would wrong the doctors to send them abroad (but: salaries could simply 
be adjusted to provide appropriate incentives rather than coercing 
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doctors, and they could be sent for limited tours of duty); it would not 
cure the underlying problem (but: it would naturally go alongside a radi-
cal cosmopolitan scheme of building domestic capacity); and so forth. 
My aim is not to defend the specifi cs of some such proposal. Instead, this 
is intended to illustrate how radical the practical implications of the 
cosmopolitan’s theoretical commitments might be. 70 
 CONCLUSIONS: THEORETICAL DISAGREEMENT 
AND MORAL PROGRESS 
 Th is chapter has given an overview of the current debate on theories 
of international justice, and shown how international justice is relevant 
to contemporary bioethical problems. I have argued for two specifi c 
conclusions. 
 First, some progress in international bioethics can be made in the face 
of uncertainty about the correct theory of global justice. A great deal of 
agreement exists on a minimum duty to provide aid to people living in 
conditions of absolute poverty. Such agreement can have implications for 
policies that can be enacted now. We should not exaggerate the diff er-
ences between diff erent views when it comes to the moral claims of 
people in desperate need. 
 Second, when it comes to the situation of the billions of people in the 
world who are only relatively poor, not absolutely poor, the diff erences 
between theories of justice make a diff erence. Consequently, to address 
comprehensively their distinctive problems in the international arena, 
bioethicists must work on issues across the spectrum of normative theory, 
from classical bioethics through to political theory. 71 Solutions to many 
of the most important problems in bioethics require simultaneously 
grappling with questions of international justice. Th e arguments just 
sketched concerning how cosmopolitan and statist liberals should 
approach IP and the health worker brain drain suggest that resolving these 
bioethical problems is likely to require committ ing to substantive claims 
about the correct theory of global justice. 72 
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